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 1. Introduction 
The term “agglomeration economies” is used to denote the mechanisms that drive employees 
and firms to co-locate geographically. Many papers have tested and quantified the importance of 
these economies1. Some analyze their influence on the geographical concentration of economic 
activities, whereas others test their effect on wages. Despite the accumulation of a substantial 
body of literature, further empirical work is needed to understand more precisely the mechanisms 
through which agglomeration economies work (Puga, 2010; and Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). The 
classification of agglomeration mechanisms which is most often used in the (empirical) literature 
is due to Marshall (1890), who described three mechanisms: labor market pooling, input sharing 
and knowledge spillovers2. A densely-populated local labor market (labor market pooling) 
facilitates the flows of workers across firms in the presence of firm-specific shocks (Krugman, 
1991) and enhances employer-employee matches (Hesley and Strange, 1990). The concentration 
of firms in a geographical area also enables firms to share input suppliers (input sharing) and 
facilitates the transmission of knowledge (knowledge spillovers).  
One of the first papers to empirically analyze the sources of agglomeration economies 
was Rosenthal and Strange (2001). These authors try to identify the characteristics of an industry 
that determine its degree of geographical concentration, using proxies of the three agglomeration 
mechanisms described by Marshall. If labor market pooling is a relevant agglomeration theory, 
then industries that use workers who are less mobile across industries should be spatially 
concentrated. If input sharing is a relevant agglomeration theory, then industries that make more 
intensive use of inputs should be spatially concentrated. Finally, the observation that knowledge-
intensive industries are more spatially concentrated would be indicative of the presence of 
knowledge spillovers. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) find that labor market pooling is the most 
important agglomeration mechanism at work and that knowledge spillovers also seem to 
contribute to industry agglomeration, but only at the local level.  
Ellison et al (2010) ingeniously twists the methodology developed by Rosenthal and 
Strange (2001) and re-defines the dependent variable, making it the tendency of two industries to 
co-locate (“co-agglomerate” is the term they use). An index that measures the co-agglomeration 
of an industry pair is then regressed on measures of the extent to which an industry pair use the 
                                                 
1 See Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) and Puga (2010) for two extensive reviews of the research on the economics of 
agglomeration. 
2 Duranton and Puga (2004) provide an alternative, more theoretically driven, classification. These authors propose 
to classify agglomeration mechanisms as sharing, matching or learning mechanisms. Agglomeration can be beneficial 
as a means to share facilities and infrastructures, input suppliers, the gains of individual specialization and a labor 
pool. Matching and learning can be enhanced in a more economically dense environment.  
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 same type of workers (labor market pooling), have a customer-supplier relationship (input 
sharing) and use the same technologies (knowledge spillovers). Although they find positive and 
statistically significant evidence of the existence of all three mechanisms, they find input sharing 
to be the most important.  
The objective of this paper is to shed more light on the relative importance of each of 
Marshall’s agglomeration mechanisms by examining the location of new manufacturing firms in 
Spain. In particular, we estimate the count of new firms by industry and location as a function of 
(pre-determined) local employment levels in industries that: 1) use similar workers (labor market 
pooling); 2) have a customer-supplier relationship (input sharing); and 3) use similar technologies 
(knowledge spillovers). 
The random co-location of an industry pair could induce the firms involved to use the 
same type of workers, to start a customer-supplier relationship or to use the same type of new 
technologies; if so, industrial relations may be the result and not the cause of co-location. Using 
the count of new firms as the dependent variable helps us to overcome this identification 
problem. From the viewpoint of an entrepreneur, location attributes are fixed at the time of the 
start-up and this eliminates the possibility of a simultaneity bias (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). 
That is, if sharing workers were the result and not the cause of co-location, the location of new 
firms would not react to the (pre-determined) geographical distribution of industries that use 
similar workers. A second contribution of this paper is that we use a novel measure of knowledge 
flows between industries. In the literature, information flows have been proxied using patent 
citations data (patents in industry i that are cited in patents of industry j) or Scherer’s (1984) 
technology matrix which measures R&D activity flows between industries. Ellison et al (2010) 
use measures based on both of these approaches, accepting that they only reflect flows of ideas at 
the highest level. We use a survey conducted by Statistics Spain asking firms about the use of new 
technologies in their production processes. This allows us to measure the extent to which two 
industries use the same new technologies in their productions. We replicate our analysis at two 
different geographical levels, the rationale being that different agglomeration mechanisms may 
operate at different geographical scales. We examine variation in the creation of new firms across 
cities and across municipalities within large cities to shed light on the geographical scope of each 
of the three agglomeration mechanisms. Since municipalities in Spain are very small3, this paper 
                                                 
3 Spanish municipalities average 60 square kilometres, being much smaller than US zip codes. In the 
sample of metropolitan US zip codes used in Rosenthal and Strange (2003), the zip code average surface is 
200 sq. km. (more than three times larger than the average Spanish municipality). 
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 studies the relative importance of the different agglomeration mechanisms within a very narrow 
geographical scope4, a question that is left unexplored in Ellison et al (2010). This constitutes the 
third contribution of this paper. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. The creation of new firms in a given 
industry is higher in areas with a strong presence of industries that use similar workers. The 
results also indicate that a strong presence of the relevant input suppliers also favors the creation 
of new firms. Hence, our results indicate that labor market pooling and input sharing are relevant 
agglomeration theories, and that the relative importance of these two mechanisms is roughly the 
same. These effects show up when we examine variation in the creation of new firms both across 
cities and across municipalities within large cities. In the latter case, we also find that new firms 
locate in areas with the presence of industries that use similar technologies, although this effect is 
relatively small. This suggests that the knowledge spillovers are relevant but operate at a limited 
geographical scale. 
In the literature, the paper that most resembles ours is Dumais et al (1997)5. These 
authors seek to explain industry employment growth as a function of the local employment levels 
in industries which use similar workers, have a customer-supplier relationship (input sharing), and 
use similar technologies. Their results suggest that labor market pooling is the most important 
agglomeration mechanism. Their contribution is, however, limited by the fact that their data are 
aggregated at the two-digit industry level, masking many of the inter-industry relations that take 
place within this level. To our knowledge, Dumais et al (1997) and Ellison et al (2010) are the 
only other studies that use inter-industry relations to shed light on the sources of agglomeration. 
However, our paper also relates to a number of studies that have tested the existence of a 
particular agglomeration mechanism. Fallick et al (2006) show that workers’ mobility between 
firms is higher in specialized areas. Overman and Puga (2010) find that industries with more risk 
are more geographically concentrated. Thus, these two studies provide evidence that, in a thick 
labor market, firms and workers are in a better position to face firm-specific shocks. Costa and 
Khan (2000) and Andersson et al (2007) have shown that employee-employer matches are better 
in densely populated areas. Other studies have tested the relevance of the input sharing 
mechanism, including Bartlesman et al (1994), Holmes (1999), Holmes and Stevens (2002) and Li 
                                                 
4 A number of papers have shown that there are agglomeration effects that have a very limited 
geographical scope, including Rosenthal and Strange (2003) using US data and Viladecans-Marsal (2004) 
and Jofre-Monseny (2009) using Spanish data. 
5 Dumais et al (1997) contains different analyses. Here, we refer to the one developed in Section 6; this 
does not appear in Dumais et al (2002), the published version of the paper. 
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 and Lu (2009). Their results indicate that the co-location of firms reduces transportation costs in 
purchasing inputs and selling outputs. It is more difficult to test for the existence of knowledge 
spillovers. The most direct test of their existence is provided by studies showing that inventors 
are more likely to cite other inventors who are geographically closer (Jaffe et al, 1993; and 
Agrawal et al, 2008). 
After this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
introduce the firm-level database used to construct the count of new firms by industry and 
location. This count constitutes the dependent variable of this paper, and is also described in this 
section. In Section 3 we explain the way in which we measure inter-industry relations along the 
three different agglomeration theories. In Section 4 we discuss the econometrics of the paper and 
in Section 5 we present the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The location of new firms 
Previous work has shown that the strength of different agglomeration mechanisms may differ at 
different geographical scales6. We therefore perform our analysis at two different geographical 
levels. First, we work with Spanish cities, which are aggregations of municipalities built on the 
basis of commuting patterns7. There are 806 such cities in Spain, although we only consider those 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants in order to exclude primarily rural areas. Finally we work with 
477 cities which in 2001 contained 95% of the Spanish population and employment. Sometimes 
we will use the term ‘between-cities analysis’ to refer to the regression analysis in which we 
explain variation in the creation of new firms across these 477 cities. Alternatively, our aim will be 
to explain variation in new firm creations across municipalities within large cities (within-cities 
analysis), in order to explore the agglomeration sources that are relevant across small 
geographical units within economically dense areas. To capture this, we select the 19 cities whose 
central municipality has more than 200,000 inhabitants. There are 755 municipalities in these 19 
cities, which contained 45% of the Spanish population and employment in 2001.  
The dependent variable is constructed using the Bureau van Dijk SABI database8. This 
firm-level database contains the location (municipality) of the firm, the year the firm was created, 
and its industry. Our dependent variable is defined as the count of firms created in 2002, 2003 
and 2004 by industry and location. 17,600 new manufacturing firms were created in Spain in this 
                                                 
6 This literature is reviewed in Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Arauzo-Carod et al (2010). 
7 The cities we use were built by Boix and Galleto (2006) by aggregating municipalities to obtain self-contained local 
labor markets. There were 8,108 municipalities in Spain in 2001. The municipalities are political and administrative 
units. We exclude the municipalities of the regions of Ceuta and Melilla (the two Spanish enclaves in North Africa). 
8 Although this database does not contain all Spanish firms, for the year 2002 it contains 80%. 
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 three-year period. The industry definition that we use corresponds to the three-digit level of the 
1993 National Classification of Economic Activities (NACE 93 Rev.1). In our regressions we 
exclude those industries with less than 15 creations in the estimation sample; this leaves us with 
75 and 62 three-digit industries in the between-cities and the within-cities analyses respectively. 
The distribution of counts of new firms per city and industry is summarized in Table 1a. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 We report the maximum and the average count of new firms per industry and city for the 
five industries with most creations, the median industry in terms of creations, and the five 
industries with fewest creations. The figure reported in the last column of the table is the share of 
cities with zero births in the industry and reflects the geographical concentration of the variable. 
The Manufacture of luggage and handbags (CNAE 192) industry has the median number of new 
firm creations (73). The city with the highest count of creations in this industry (13) is Ubrique-
Elda, one of the leather clusters in Spain. Table 1b shows the analogous figures for the count of 
new firms per municipality and industry. The Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles and their engines (CNAE 343) has the median number of new firm creations (39), the 
municipality of Madrid being the location with the highest count of new firms in this industry (5). 
 
3. Inter-industry relations and agglomeration theories 
Inter-industry relations are the basis for identifying the sources of agglomeration economies. Our 
strategy is to construct measures of the extent to which two industries 1) use the same type of 
workers (labor market pooling); 2) have a customer-supplier relationship (input sharing); or 3) 
share technology and knowledge (knowledge spillovers). Once we have these measures for all 
industry pairs, we construct weighted sums of (pre-determined) employment levels by industry 
and location, where higher weights are assigned to industries with stronger relationships 
throughout the three different dimensions. These industry-specific weighted sums of 
employment can thus be interpreted as the employment in industries that: 1) use workers with 
the same occupations as those used by industry i (laboric); 2) supply inputs to industry i (inputic); 3) 
buy the outputs of industry i (outputic); and 4) use the new production technologies (technoic) used 
by industry i. 
Labor market pooling: Labor market pooling denotes the advantages that firms and 
employees obtain from locating in a thick labor market. If labor market pooling is a relevant 
agglomeration theory, then industries that use similar workers should co-locate because of the 
higher workers’ mobility between these industries. Following Dumais et al (1997) and Ellison et 
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 al (2010) we look at the distribution of workers by industry and occupation. We consider all the 
manufacturing workers contained in the second quarters of the 2001 and 2005 waves of the 
Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA). Workers are classified in 207 different occupations which 
correspond to the three-digit level of the 1994 National Classification of Occupations listed in 
Table A1 in the Annex. The variable labor similarityij measures the extent to which the distribution 
of workers by occupation in industry i is similar to that in industry j: 
∑211 o j
oj
i
oi
ij L
L
L
L=similaritylabor -                    (1) 
where o indexes occupation and L denotes number of workers. Notice that labor similarityij is the 
inverse of a Duncan and Duncan (1955) dissimilarity index. This index is bounded between 0 and 
1 and, in this application, can be interpreted as the share of workers in industry j that need to 
change occupation to mimic the distribution of occupations in industry i. Hence, the variable 
labor similarityij takes positive values that are greater than one and is computed for all industry pairs 
(including those in the agriculture and the services sectors). We rank all J industries in descending 
order based on their labor similarity with industry i and construct the following industry-specific 
weights: 
             0=LijW                                       10if >r  
                         ∑101== r ij
ijL
ij
similaritylabor
similaritylabor
W
 
 
         10if ≤r                                              (2) 
where r identifies the rth closest industry in this labor market pooling metric. To increase the 
weights assigned to the closest industries, we only consider the 10th closest. The highest weight in 
our sample corresponds to the Manufacture of rubber products (CNAE 251) and the 
Manufacture of plastic products (CNAE 252) industry pair. Based on this industry-specific set of 
weights we construct the variable laboric: 
∑ ≠= ij cjLijic )L·W(labor            (3) 
which is a weighted sum of industry (j) and location (c) employment levels where industries that 
use workers who are more similar to those used by industry i are given higher weights. Hence, 
laboric is a measure of the local employment in the industries that use the same workers as those 
used by industry i. 
Input sharing: The concentration of firms in a geographical area enables them to share a 
larger base of suppliers and, at the same time, to be closer to customers. Following previous 
7
 work, we use data from Input-Output Tables to characterize customer-supplier relations. In 
particular, we use data from the 2001 Catalan Input-Output Table built by Statistics Catalonia 
(IDESCAT)9. We use this regional table instead of the Spanish one because it enables us to 
characterize customer-supplier relations for narrowly defined industries10. We construct the two 
following sets of industry-specific weights: 
i
jiI
ij inputs total
inputs
W →=                        (4) 
i
jiO
ij outputs total
outputs
W →=                                                        (5) 
I
ijW  is the share of the inputs that industry i purchases from industry j (including those in the 
agriculture and the services sectors). Conversely, OijW  is the share of the outputs produced by 
industry i that are purchased by industry j. The most intense dependence on a single input 
supplier industry is that shown by the producers of Manufacture of articles of paper and 
paperboard (CNAE 212) which obtain 66% of their inputs from producers of Manufacture of 
pulp, paper and paperboard (CNAE 211). The most intense dependence on a single customer is 
that shown by the producers of Manufacture of prepared animal food (CNAE 157) which sell 
96% of their output to the producers in Agriculture, hunting and related service activities (CNAE 
100). Based on these two industry-specific sets of weights we construct the variables inputic and 
outputic: 
( )∑ ≠= ij cjIijic L·Winput                                  (6) 
( )∑ ≠= ij cjOijic L·Woutput                 (7) 
which are weighted sums of industry (j) and location (c) employment levels where industries that 
have stronger customer-supplier relationships are given higher weights. Notice that inputic 
measures the local employment in the industries that are industry i’s main input supplier. 
Likewise, outputic measures the local employment in the industries that are industry i’s main 
customers. 
                                                 
9 Catalonia is a region in the north-east of Spain. In 2001, the population of Catalonia (6,361,365 inhabitants) 
represented 15.5% of the Spanish population, 17.5% of its employment and 24% of its manufacturing employment.  
10 The Catalan (Spanish) Input-Output table enables us to characterize the supplier-customer relations for 122 (71) 
industry pairs. However, inputic and outputic do not vary at the three digit level in all cases as the Input-Output 
products can only be grouped into 54 manufacturing industries. We address this mismatch by clustering the standard 
errors at the two-digit industry and location in all the estimations. 
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 Knowledge spillovers: Marshall (1890) considered that knowledge and ideas flow more 
easily between firms and employees located nearby (knowledge spillovers). If firms co-locate to 
share knowledge and ideas, industries that use similar knowledge should be co-located. 
Knowledge spillovers are difficult to measure. In the literature, information flows between 
industries have been proxied using patent citations data (patents in industry i that are cited in 
patents of industry j) or Scherer’s (1984) technology matrix which measures R&D activity flows 
between industries. Ellison et al (2010) use measures based on both approaches, accepting that 
they only reflect flows of ideas at the highest level. The construction of measures of information 
flows between industries using patent citations data or Scherer’s (1984) technology matrix seems 
especially hard to justify in the Spanish context. The Spanish economy has low levels of 
innovation: innovation expenditure accounts for only 1.35% of GDP, compared with 2.77% in 
the US. The picture that emerges from patent data is even more striking: 0.005 patents per one 
thousand inhabitants in Spain, compared with 0.048 in the US. In the light of these figures, we 
propose an alternative approach to measure the extent to which different industries share 
knowledge. We use a survey conducted by Statistics Spain in 1998 asking manufacturing firms 
about their use of 26 different new technologies in their production processes (a complete list of 
these new technologies in production is shown in Table A2)11. The variable technology similarityij 
measures the extent to which industry i and j use the same new technologies in their production 
processes: 
∑211 n j
nj
i
ni
ij NT
NT
-
NT
NT=similarity technology           (8) 
where n indexes new technologies in production and NTni/NTi denotes the share of firms in 
industry i which, using at least one new technology in production, use technology n. The 
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes (CNAE 321) and the Manufacture of television and 
radio transmitters (CNAE 322) represent one of the closest industry relations in terms of sharing 
new technologies. We rank all J industries in descending order based on their technology 
similarity with industry i and construct the following industry-specific weights: 
                0W Tij =                                              3>r if  
                                ∑3 1== r ij
ijT
ij
similarity echnologyt
similarity echnologyt
W          3≤r if                                      (9) 
                                                 
11 The name of this special survey is “Use of new technologies in Manufacturing” and was carried out in 
1998 as part of the broader “Survey on Technological Innovation in Companies”, compiled annually. 
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 where r identifies the rth closest industry in this knowledge spillovers metric. We set r=3 as a 
means of increasing the weight assigned to the closest industries12. Based on this industry-specific 
set of weights we construct the variable technoic: 
( )∑ ≠= ij cjTijic L·Wtechno                     (10) 
which is the weighted sum of industry (j) and location (c) employment levels where industries that 
use more similar new technologies in their production processes are given higher weights. Hence, 
technoic is a measure of the local employment in the industries that share knowledge and ideas with 
industry i. 
 
4. Econometric specification and identification issues 
Model Specification: We use the random profit maximization approach (Carlton, 1983) to 
formalize the location decisions of new firms. A linearized expected profit function can be 
written as: 
kiciiciciickic ε+γ'xempδ+β'a=π +⋅                                (11) 
where kicπ  denotes the profit level that firm k, belonging to industry i, would obtain in 
geographical unit c. This profit level is determined by local agglomeration economies that are 
relevant for industry i, aic. This vector contains the log-employment in industries that: 1) use 
workers with the same occupations as those used by industry i (laboric); 2) supply inputs to 
industry i (inputic); 3) buy the outputs of industry i (outputic); and 4) use the new production 
technologies (technoic) used by industry i. The variable empic, captures the own-industry 
employment in location c whereas icx  is a vector of control variables, which will be described 
below. kicε  is an unobservable random term which varies across firms and locations. 
If firms locate where profits are the highest and kicε  follows an (iid) Extreme Value Type 
II distribution, the probability that firm k locates in geographical unit c has a Conditional Logit 
form: 
                            ∑ ⋅+
+⋅=
c iiciciic
iiciciic
γ'x+empδβ'a
γ'xempδ+β'ac) in locatesk  Pr(firm                              (12) 
Guimarães et al (2003) have shown that the Conditional Logit coefficients can be equivalently 
estimated using the Poisson regression with exponential mean function: 
                                                 
12 Setting r=3 may seem inconsistent with the weights defined to characterize proximity in the labor market pooling 
metric. This choice is determined by the fact that there are fewer industry pairs to consider. First, only the 
manufacturing industries were surveyed on their use of new technologies in production. Second, this survey is only 
available for an aggregation of the three-digit industry classification (29 manufacturing industries). 
10
 )γ'xempδ+β'aexp()E(N iiciciicict +⋅=                          (13) 
where the dependent variable, Nict, is the count of new firms in industry i that locate in 
geographical unit c. This implies that Poisson estimates can be given a Random Profit 
Maximization interpretation.  
In a different vein, Becker and Henderson (2000) considered a situation in which each 
location has a latent pool of geographically immobile entrepreneurs. This pool of entrepreneurs 
will result in more or less new firms being created in industry i (as opposed to firms being created 
in other industries or firms not being created at all) depending on the expected profits of doing 
so (demand side) and the number of ‘latent’ entrepreneurs in the area (supply side). Hence, the 
number of firms being created in industry i and location c is determined by local variables that 
shift firms’ profits (like local agglomeration economies) and the potential pool of local 
entrepreneurs (the size of the local economy). Hence, the estimates of (13) can also be 
interpreted as the outcome of geographically immobile entrepreneurs creating more or less firms 
in response to local conditions. Brülhart et al (2007) label these two observationally equivalent 
models as the ‘Footloose Startup’ and the ‘Latent Startup’ models. 
In our empirical specification the dependent variable, Nic, is the number of new firms 
created in industry i and geographical unit c (cities in the between-cities analysis and 
municipalities in the within-cities analysis) between 2002 and 2004. The explanatory variables 
correspond to 2001 (to avoid simultaneity). Since the explanatory variables are measured in logs, 
the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities13. All specifications include the own-
industry employment as a control variable where a separate parameter is estimated for each 
industry, allowing the strength of the so-called localization economies to be industry-specific (i.e. 
ici empδ ⋅ )14. Our most parsimonious specification includes industry fixed effects ( ia ) and two 
additional controls, the urban surface of the geographical unit of analysis (landc) and a set of fixed 
effects for some aggregation of the geographical units of analysis (ar). Hence, the baseline 
specification (whose results are reported in the first column of Tables 2 and 3) is: 
( ) ( )ircliciicic αalandγmpeδβaNE ++⋅+⋅+′= exp                     (14) 
                                                 
13 Given that these variables are zero for some industries and municipalities, we follow Crépon and Duguet (1997) 
and sum one to the observations that are zero to take the log of this transformed variable. Additionally, we include a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the original variable was zero. For instance, [ ]( ) [ ]0=1⋅+0=1+⋅ iclaboriciclabor labordlaborlaborlogβ  corresponds to the way in which laboric enters the 
specification. 
14 Given that the employment level is also zero in some industries and municipalities, we apply to this variable the 
transformation proposed by Crépon and Duguet (1997) described in footnote 13.  
11
 where landc will be the (log) land area of the city (in the between-cities analysis) or that of the 
municipality (in the within-cities analysis) and is included following Bartik (1985), who 
emphasized that geographical units with more available land are ‘mechanically’ more likely to be 
chosen. In the between-cities analysis, the term ar corresponds to 17 European NUTS-2 fixed 
effects which control for location determinants that are common to all locations within a region 
such as the market potential (in terms of consumers)15, regional policies, or the remoteness of an 
area. In the within-cities analysis, the term ar corresponds to (aggregate) city fixed effects. In 
terms of the Random Profit Maximization Framework (the ‘Footloose Entrepreneurial’ model), 
one can think of location choices as being made in two sequential steps: Mobile entrepreneurs 
first choose the city and then, in the second step, decide in which municipality to locate within 
the chosen city. Our estimates can be interpreted as estimates of location determinants driving 
this second decision. 
In the second specification, we additionally include the overall employment level 
excluding that of industry i (emp-ic) in order to control for the so-called urbanization economies 
(the effect of the size of the local economy on firms’ profitability) and for the fact that larger 
local economies have more latent entrepreneurs. Hence, the specification whose results 
correspond to the second column of Tables 2 and 3 is: 
    ( ) ( )irclicurbiciicic αalandγempδmpeδβaexpNE ++⋅+⋅+⋅+′= −                         (15) 
In a third specification, using the fact that the variables of interest vary across industries 
and locations, we include location-specific fixed effects (city-fixed effects in the between-cities 
analysis and municipality-fixed effects in the within cities analysis). This implies that variables that 
only show variation across locations (e.g. landc) are no longer identified16. The specification whose 
results are reported in the third column of Tables 2 and 3 is: 
( ) ( )iciciicic αampeδβaexpNE ++⋅+′=                                                    (16) 
where ac is the location fixed effect. This is our preferred specification since it effectively controls 
for location determinants (i.e. natural advantages) that are not always easy to measure, such as 
wages, the composition of the labor force, rents, business climate, land-use regulations, proximity 
to airports and major infrastructures.  
                                                 
15 In a paper that examines the effect of consumer market potential on the location of multinational firms across 
European regions, Head and Mayer (2004) consider that Spain comprises 7 NUTS 1 regions. 
16 In fact, the overall employment level does vary by industry, since it excludes own-industry employment. However, 
the variation is small and its inclusion generates problems of convergence in the estimation routines. 
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 In these analyses, there is one observation for each industry in every city (or municipality), 
implying that city (or municipality) shocks would generate correlated error terms. Failing to 
account for this group component of the error term can result in estimated standard errors that 
are too small (Moulton, 1990). Besides, as mentioned above: a) the match between the 
classification of products (Input-Output Tables) and industries is not perfect; and b) the Survey 
of the Use of New Technologies in Production was not carried out at the three-digit level in all 
industries. This implies that for some industries, the variables of interest (inputic, outputic and 
technoic) take the same values for some three-digit industries within the two-digit industry 
classification, generating an additional source of (grouped-structure) correlation in the error term. 
In order to produce valid statistical inference, we cluster the standard errors at the city and two-
digit industry level in the between-city analysis (and at the municipality and two-digit industry 
level in the within-cities analysis). 
Identification issues: Ellison et al (2010) explains the co-location of industry pairs as a 
function of the extent to which industry pairs use the same type of workers, have a customer-
supplier relationship, and use the same new technologies. This approach, which exploits purely 
cross-sectional data variation, faces two important identification difficulties: simultaneity, and the 
presence of omitted variables with the potential of confounding the effects of interest. The co-
location of an industry pair driven by natural advantage (e.g. the presence of a port) could induce 
firms in this industry pair to use the same type of workers, to start a customer-supplier 
relationship or to use the same type of new technologies, implying that industrial relations may be 
the result and not the cause of co-location (a simultaneity bias). Concerns regarding identification 
would not entirely disappear if one were willing to assume that inter-industry relations are the 
cause and not the result of co-location: it could be that industries that co-locate due to a common 
dependence on an unobserved natural advantage turn out to employ similar workers, use similar 
technologies or have a customer-supplier relationship (an omitted variables bias). For instance, 
two industries that turn out to use similar workers may locate in the same area not in order to 
share workers but attracted by the proximity to a hub airport (a location factor omitted by the 
researcher). 
In order to minimize the potential confounding effect of natural advantages, Ellison et al 
(2010) construct an estimated spatial distribution of industries based on the 16 natural advantages 
studied in Ellison and Glaeser (1999). Using this estimated spatial distribution of industries, they 
construct an index which reflects co-agglomeration due to natural advantage and introduce this 
index as a control variable in the regressions. However, this control is far from perfect, given the 
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 difficulties found in measuring some natural advantages. To deal with the simultaneity bias (the 
fact that inter-industry relations are the result and not the cause of agglomeration), Ellison et al 
(2010) resort to an instrumental variables approach, using UK data to construct measures of 
inter-industry relations which are then used to instrument their US counterparts. However, as the 
authors concede, these instruments will only mitigate this simultaneity bias if there are similarities 
in the ways in which natural advantage drives industry co-location in the US and in the UK17. 
Using the count of new firms as the dependent variable helps us to overcome both the 
omitted variable and the simultaneity biases. Regarding the potential bias due to unobserved 
natural advantage, our approach allows us to condition the count of new firms in year t on the 
stock of own-industry employment in year t-1. Notice that the omitted factors that drive the 
location of new firms in year t are very likely to have driven the location decisions of new firms in 
the past. To give an example, in an industry where proximity to airports is particularly important, 
the geographical distribution of its old firms will be very strongly correlated with the geographical 
distribution of its new firms. Hence, the stock of employment in year t-1 acts as a catch-all 
control variable for sector-specific location determinants (either observed or unobserved)18. As 
previous studies of the location decisions of new firms have pointed out, location attributes are 
fixed at the time of the start-up (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). In other words, the characteristics 
of cities (or municipalities) are seen as fixed from the viewpoint of a single entrepreneur, 
eliminating the possibility of a simultaneity bias. If sharing workers were the result and not the 
cause of co-location, the location of new firms would not react to the (pre-determined) 
geographical distribution of industries that use similar workers. Notice, however, that this is only 
true if there are no confounding unobserved location determinants (i.e. natural advantages). In 
this respect, we emphasize that besides including the stock of employment in year t-1 as a catch-
all control for sector-specific location determinants, our preferred econometric specification, 
described in (6), contains location-specific fixed effects. These fixed effects control for all the 
observed and unobserved location determinants that do not vary by industry, including wages, 
the composition of the labor force, rents, business climate, land-use regulations, proximity to 
airports and major infrastructures.  
 
                                                 
17 As an alternative set of instruments, Ellison et al (2010) measure inter-industry relations in areas in the 
US where pairs of industries are not co-agglomerated. The main results of the paper turn out to be similar 
using either the UK instruments or this alternative set.  
18 Becker and Henderson (2000) argue that if location determinants are very persistent over time, 
conditioning the count of new firms in year t on the stock of pre-existing firms is essentially equivalent to 
introducing location- and sector-specific fixed effects.  
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 5. The results 
Between-cities evidence: We first report and discuss the baseline results obtained when 
we analyze variation in new firms across (aggregated) cities. The first column in Table 2 shows 
the results of the specification described in (14), where new firms in industry i are regressed on 
the variables of interest (namely, laboric- employment in industries that use workers with the same 
occupations as those employed by industry i, inputic- employment in industry i’s input suppliers, 
outputic- employment in industry i’s customers i and technoic- employment in industries that use the 
same new production technologies as those used in industry i) and a set of control variables: 
own-industry employment, the urban surface of the city, and industry and regional fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The fact that the explanatory variables are measured in logarithms coupled with the 
Poisson exponential mean specification implies that the coefficient estimates in Table 2 can be 
interpreted as elasticities. The estimates reported in the first column imply that a 1% increase in 
the city employment in industries that use workers with the same occupations as those used by 
industry i increases new firms’ creation in this industry by 0.11%. Likewise, a 1% increase in the 
city employment in industries that provide the inputs to industry i increases new firms’ creation 
in this industry by 0.27%. Employment increases in industry i’s customers and employment 
increases in industries that use the same new technologies in production as those used in industry 
i do not affect on the creation of new firms in this industry. Hence, the between-cities results 
suggest that labor market pooling and input sharing seem to be relevant agglomeration 
mechanisms at the city level, whereas knowledge spillovers do not. 
The results of the second specification, described in (15), are reported in the second 
column of Table 2. This specification includes the employment level in the city (excluding that of 
industry i) as an additional control. This has implications for the way in which the estimates of 
interest are interpreted. Notice that an employment increase in a given industry, keeping the 
overall employment level constant, implies an employment reduction in another industry. Hence, 
a 1% employment increase in industry i’s input suppliers drawn from other industries in the city 
increases new firms’ creation in this industry by 0.33%. Likewise, an analogous employment 
increase in industries that use similar workers as those used by industry i increases new firm 
creations in this industry by 0.13%. The negative coefficient estimate for the overall employment 
implies that more employment deters firm births, holding constant the employment in industry i 
and in those industries that are especially relevant for industry i (industries that use workers with 
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 the same occupations, have a customer or supplier relationship or use the same new production 
technologies). This suggests that the crowding effects associated with this employment increase 
(increased wages, rents and congestion) more than offsets the benefits of agglomeration. Notice 
that the positive effects of employment increases in specific industries can thus be interpreted as 
net effects of agglomeration (agglomeration benefits offsetting crowding or congestion costs). 
Specification 3, described by (16), whose results are reported in the third column of Table 
2 includes city fixed effects. The estimates imply that a 1% employment increase in industries that 
use similar workers to those used by industry i increases firm births by 0.12%. Likewise, a 
1%increase in city employment in industries that provide inputs to industry i increases new firm 
births in this industry by 0.26%. Overall, the results are relatively similar in all three specifications 
and indicate that input sharing and labor market pooling are relevant agglomeration mechanisms, 
whereas we find no evidence supporting the relevance of the knowledge spillover theory. 
Within-cities evidence: Different agglomeration mechanisms may operate at different 
intensities at different geographical scales. Table 3 shows the results of our analysis of variation in 
the creation of new firms across municipalities within large (aggregated) cities. In our baseline 
specification, we restrict our sample to (aggregated) cities where the central city has more than 
200,000 inhabitants. The results shown in the three columns in Table 3 correspond to the 
specifications discussed in Table 1, adapted to the geographical unit of analysis in question (i.e. 
the municipality). In the first column, new firms are regressed on the variables of interest, own-
industry employment, the urban surface of the municipality and city fixed effects. The results 
reported in the second column are those of a specification in which the overall (outside industry) 
employment is included as an additional control variable. In the third and last specification, there 
are municipality specific fixed effects which imply that identification comes from the variation in 
the creation of new firms across industries within municipalities. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The results reported in the first column in Table 3 imply that a 1% increase in municipal 
employment in industries that use similar workers to those used by industry i increases firm 
births in this industry by 0.065%. Likewise, an analogous employment increase in industries that 
provide inputs to industry i increases firm births in industry i by 0.22%. Employment increases in 
industries that buy the outputs of industry i and employment increases in industries that use the 
same new technologies as those used in industry i do not have an effect on firm births in industry 
i. The results in the second specification imply that increasing the overall employment in 
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 municipality i (holding constant the employment in industry i and in those industries that are 
especially relevant for industry i) reduces the creation of new firms in this industry by 0.41%. The 
comparison of the coefficient estimates in the first and second columns in Table 3 indicates that 
keeping employment size fixed increases the estimated effects of interest. The effect of an 
employment increase in industries that use workers with the same occupations rises from 0.065% 
to 0.115% whereas the effect of an employment increase in industries that supply inputs rises 
from 0.22% to 0.42%. Finally, an employment increase in industries that use the same new 
technologies in production as those used by industry i increases firm births by 11%, suggesting 
that knowledge spillovers may also be relevant. The results obtained in the third specification 
(which includes municipality fixed effects) are similar to those reported in the second column, 
although the effect of an employment increase in industries that buy the outputs of industry i 
increases and becomes (weakly) statistically significant. Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that 
all agglomeration theories are relevant. There are many reasons why knowledge spillovers appear 
as a relevant agglomeration theory in the within-cities analysis (Table 3) and not in the between-
cities analysis (Table 2). Nevertheless, we stress one of them: the geographical scope of 
knowledge spillovers is probably very limited and the municipality may be a more appropriate 
geographical unit to capture these effects. 
The relative importance of different agglomeration mechanisms: All the reported 
coefficients have the interpretation of elasticities which are meaningful in themselves. However, 
in the interests of comparability across the size of the coefficient estimates (and the relative 
importance of different agglomeration mechanisms), we report the average marginal effect of 
increasing 1,000 employees in each of the variables of interest19. The results, based on the 
location specific fixed effects specification (results shown in the third columns of Tables 2 and 3), 
are shown in Table 4. 
  [Insert Table 4 here] 
In the between-cities analysis, an increase of 1,000 employees in industries that use 
workers with the same occupations as those used by industry i creates 2.24 new firms (over a 3-
year period). Likewise, an increase of 1,000 employees in the industries that supply inputs to 
industry i creates 1.42 new firms over the same time period. Hence, taking these estimates at their 
face values implies that labor market pooling is a more relevant agglomeration theory than input 
                                                 
19 For the X variable, the marginal effect for individual i is given by )⋅⋅ exp()Xβ( iX . We average the marginal 
effect across all observations. 
17
 sharing. Labor market pooling and input sharing seem to have the same order of magnitude 
when we examine variation in the creation of new firms across municipalities within large cities. 
An increase of 1,000 employees in industries that use workers with the same occupations as those 
used by industry i creates 1.56 new firms, whereas the same employment increase in the 
industries that supply inputs to industry i creates 1.45 new firms. Much smaller is the implied 
effect of an equal increase in the employment of industries that use the same new technologies in 
production as those used by industry i (0.6 births). More employment in industries that buy the 
outputs of industry i has a tiny effect on the births of firms in this industry. 
It is also interesting to compare the estimates across the two columns (between vs. within 
city evidence) since this may shed some light on the relevance of different agglomeration 
mechanisms at different geographical scales. The results indicate that an increase of 1,000 
employees in industries that use workers with the same occupations as those used by industry i 
generates a higher impact if this increase is at the city level (2.24 new firms) than at the 
municipality level (1.56). This is consistent with the intuition that labor market pooling operates 
at the city-level (a self-contained labor market), implying that estimates based on within-city 
comparisons underestimate the labor market pooling effects by failing to internalize spillovers 
occurring between municipalities within cities. In contrast, an increase of 1,000 employees in 
industries that use the same new technologies as those used in industry i has a much larger effect 
if this increase is at the municipality level (0.6 new firms) rather than at the city-level (0.1 new 
firms) suggesting that in order to generate firm births, the activities using similar technologies 
must be concentrated in a given municipality within the city. The effects of an increase of 1,000 
employees in industries that are the input suppliers of industry i are similar if they take place at 
the city or at the municipality level (about 1.4 new firms). 
Robustness checks: As a first robustness check, we assess the extent to which our results 
are sensitive to the somewhat arbitrary definition of the local employment level in the industries 
that share workers (laboric) and knowledge (technoic) with industry i. laboric (technoic) are weighted 
sums of industry (j) and location (c) employment levels where industries that use workers (new 
technologies) more similar to those used in industry i are given higher weights. Industries that are 
not among the ten closest in terms of sharing workers are given a weight of zero. Likewise, 
industries that are not among the three closest in terms of sharing knowledge are given a weight 
of zero. Among the 10(3) closest industries, the closer the industry is, the higher the weight 
assigned to this industry – see expressions (2) and (9) for a formal definition of these weighting 
schemes. As a first alternative measure, we apply the scheme just described to the 15(5) closest 
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 industries. Formally, this amounts to setting r=15 in the labor market pooling metric, expression 
(2), and r=5 in the knowledge spillovers metric, expression (9). The results are shown in the 
second column of Tables 5 (between-cities) and 6 (within-cities). The second alternative that we 
consider can be described as follows. Industries that are not among the 10(3) closest are given a 
weight of zero but the 10(3) closest industries are all given the same weight. The results of this 
second exercise are shown in the third column of Tables 5 (between-cities) and 6 (within-cities). 
   [Insert Table 5 here] 
   [Insert Table 6 here] 
 The results shown in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that our results are robust to the precise 
definition of the local employment level in the industries that share workers (laboric) and 
knowledge (technoic) with industry i, thus showing that our analysis is consistent. The within-cities 
evidence is based on examining variations in the creation of new firms across municipalities 
within the largest cities in the country. In particular, we select the 19 cities whose central 
municipality has more than 200,000 inhabitants. In order to explore whether our results are 
sensitive to this particular cutoff, we replicate the within-cities evidence for the largest 6 and 31 
cities in Spain (the number of cities whose central municipality has more than 500,000 and 
150,000 inhabitants, respectively). The results are shown in the second and third columns in 
Table 7. 
   [Insert Table 7 here] 
 The overall tenor of the results does not change across the columns in Table 7, although 
the coefficient estimates that correspond to technoic (the local employment level in the industries 
that share knowledge) change significantly across the specifications. The results suggest that 
when examining firm locations across municipalities within large cities, knowledge spillovers 
become increasingly important as one restricts the attention to increasingly large (and dense) 
cities. This suggests that knowledge spillovers are especially relevant in the densest economic 
environments.  
Discussion of the results: Our results corroborate those of previous studies in the 
literature which support the empirical relevance of the Marshallian agglomeration economies 
reviewed in the introduction. In fact, we find evidence for each of the three agglomeration 
mechanisms (labor market pooling, input sharing and technological spillovers). In this respect, 
our results are similar to those found by Ellison et al (2010) and Dumais et al (1997), the other 
studies that use inter-industry relations to assess the relative importance of different 
agglomeration mechanisms. Our results suggest that labor market pooling is the most important 
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 agglomeration mechanism (especially in the between-cities analysis). The same result has been 
found in Dumais et al (1997) and Rosenthal and Strange (2001) but not in Ellison et al (2010), 
who concluded that input sharing is the most relevant agglomeration mechanism. Our results 
also indicate that knowledge spillovers are relevant but only at a very local level. In any case, the 
results that support the relevance of the knowledge spillovers mechanism also imply that sharing 
knowledge is less important than sharing workers or having a customer-supplier to explain the 
co-location of industry pairs. Similar results appear in Dumais et al (1997) and Ellison et al 
(2010), probably related in some way to the difficulties found in measuring inter-industry 
knowledge flows. In fact, Ellison et al (2010) considered that part of the inter-industry knowledge 
flows may take place through workers’ mobility between industries (labor market pooling) or 
through customer-supplier relationships (input sharing). 
 The result that knowledge spillovers are only relevant to explain agglomeration at a very 
local level suggests that this agglomeration mechanism has a very limited geographical scope. 
This result is in line with the study by Rosenthal and Strange (2001) which found that industries 
that are more knowledge-intensive are more spatially concentrated but only at the zip code level. 
Besides, the robustness analysis suggests that knowledge spillovers are especially relevant in the 
densest economic environments. Our results also indicate that the labor market pooling 
mechanism is more important in explaining agglomeration between cities than within cities. This 
is consistent with the intuition that labor market pooling should operate at the local labor market 
level. In contrast, the input sharing mechanism seems to act with the same strength in the 
between- and within-cities analyses. This is somewhat surprising since transport costs are not 
expected to be particularly high across locations within a city. One possibility is that inter-
industry customer-supplier relations partly capture knowledge flows between industries.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature of the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies 
and quantifies the relative importance of the different Marshallian agglomeration mechanisms by 
examining the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain. As recently stated in the literature, 
examining inter-industry relationships constitutes a powerful approach for empirically identifying 
different agglomeration theories. Following this line of research, we regressed the creation of new 
firms by industry and location on employment in industries that: 1) use similar workers (labor 
market pooling); 2) have a customer-supplier relationship (input sharing); and 3) use similar 
technologies (knowledge spillovers). We find evidence of the three Marshallian mechanisms 
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 (labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers) but their incidence differs 
depending on the geographical scale of the analysis. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. New manufacturing firms tend to locate 
in areas with more employment in industries that use similar workers in terms of their skills, and 
in areas with more employment in industries that have a customer-supplier relationship. These 
effects show up when we analyze firm locations both across cities and across municipalities 
within cities. When we examine firm location decisions within cities we find that new firms are 
also attracted to areas with more employment in industries using the same technologies as those 
used by industry i. This suggests that knowledge spillovers are a relevant agglomeration source 
operating at a small geographical scale. 
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Table 1a. New firms in Spain. City-level. Years 2002-2004. 75 three-digit manufacturing industries 
Industry 
New 
firms 
New 
firms (%)
Mean Maximum 
Cities with zero 
births (%) 
The five industries with the highest number of new firms 
Manufacture of structural metal products (CNAE 281) 2,188 15.65% 4.587 167 (Madrid) 26.21% 
Printing and service activities related to printing (CNAE 222) 1,159 8.29% 2.430 294 (Madrid) 61.64% 
Manufacture of furniture (CNAE 361) 1,108 7.92% 2.323 101 (Valencia) 49.06% 
Publishing (CNAE 221) 971 6.94% 2.036 329 (Madrid) 73.38% 
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories (CNAE 182) 593 4.24% 1.243 86 (Madrid) 69.81% 
Median      
Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness (CNAE 192) 73 0.52% 0.153 13 (Ubrique - Elda) 94.76% 
The five industries with the highest number of new firms 
Manufacture of motor vehicles (CNAE 341) 19 0.14% 0.040 3 (Barcelona - Zaragoza) 96.86% 
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products (CNAE 156) 18 0.13% 0.377 2 (Madrid) 96.44% 
Manufacture of sports goods (CNAE 364) 17 0.12% 0.356 6 (Barcelona) 97.90% 
Manufacture of leather clothes (CNAE 181) 16 0.11% 0.335 4 (Madrid) 97.48% 
Manufacture of insulated wire and cable (CNAE 313) 16 0.11% 0.335 3 (Barcelona - Zaragoza) 97.69% 
      
Table 1b. New firms in Spain. Municipalities within largest cities. Years 2002-2004. 62 three-digit manufacturing industries 
Industry 
New 
firms 
New 
firms (%)
Mean Maximum 
Municipalities with 
zero births (%) 
The five industries with the highest number of new firms 
Manufacture of structural metal products (CNAE 281) 836 14.32% 1.107 45 (Barcelona) 66.75% 
Publishing (CNAE 221 721 12.35% 0.955 241 (Madrid) 86.23% 
Printing and service activities related to printing (CNAE 222) 721 12.35% 0.955 148 (Madrid) 79.47% 
Manufacture of furniture (CNAE 361) 402 6.89% 0.532 25 (Madrid) 81.19% 
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories (CNAE 182) 312 5.34% 0.413 62 (Madrid) 88.34% 
Median      
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (CNAE 343) 39 0.67% 0.516 5 (Madrid) 96.82% 
The five industries with the lowest number of new firms  
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus (CNAE 312) 17 0.29% 0.225 2 (Madrid) 98.01% 
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur (CNAE 183) 16 0.27% 0.212 7 (Barcelona) 98.81% 
Manufacture of diverse non-metallic mineral products (CNAE 268) 16 0.27% 0.212 2 (Murcia) 98.01% 
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats (CNAE 154) 15 0.26% 0.199 3 (Madrid) 98.68% 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard (CNAE 211) 15 0.26% 0.199 3 (Barcelona) 98.28% 
Source: Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (SABI).  
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Table 2. Agglomeration economies estimates (between-cities evidence). Poisson estimates. The 
dependent variable is the count of new firms created by industry and city.  
 I II III 
Agglomeration mechanisms    
0.107*** 0.125*** 0.118*** Labor Market Pooling;  
laboric  (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) 
Input Sharing;    
0.268*** 0.326*** 0.264*** inputic (0.042) (0.046) (0.043) 
-0.036 -0.007 0.042 outputic (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
-0.025 -0.001 0.010 Knowledge Spillovers; 
technoic (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Controls    
 -0.143*** City employment 
(excluding that of industry i)  (0.037) n.i. 
Own industry city employment Yes Yes Yes 
City land area Yes Yes n.i. 
City fixed effects No No Yes 
Regional fixed effects 
(17 NUTS 2 regions) Yes Yes n.i. 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of industries 75 75 75 
No. of cities 477 477 477 
No. of observations 35,775 35,775 35,775 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the two-digit industry and city level; 2) ***, ** 
and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent; 3) All the explanatory variables measured in its 
logarithmic form (those with zero values have been transformed as detailed in the text); 4) laboric, inputic, 
outputic and technoic are (weighted) sums of the employment in different industries in each city. The weights are 
industry-specific and reflect the intensity of inter-industry relationships. laboric is the employment in 
industries that use workers with the same occupations as those employed in industry i. inputic is the 
employment in industry i’s input suppliers. outputic is the employment in industry i’s customers and technoic is 
the employment in industries that use the same new production technologies as those used in industry i; 5) 
n.i. indicates that the variable is not identified because it does not vary across industries in a given city. 
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 Table 3. Agglomeration economies estimates (within-cities evidence). Poisson estimates. 
The dependent variable is the count of new firms created by industry and municipality.  
 I II III 
Agglomeration mechanisms    
0.065* 0.115*** 0.099*** Labor Market Pooling;  
laboric  (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 
Input Sharing;    
0.225*** 0.424*** 0.369*** inputic (0.067) (0.073) (0.060) 
-0.027 0.026 0.095* outputic (0.059) (0.061) (0.055) 
0.016 0.113*** 0.130*** Knowledge Spillovers; 
technoic (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) 
Controls    
 -0.412*** Overall municipality employment  
(excluding that of industry i)  (0.060) n.i. 
Own industry employment in the municipality  Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality land area Yes Yes n.i. 
Municipality fixed effects No No Yes 
City fixed effects Yes Yes n.i. 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of industries 62 62 62 
No. of municipalities 775 775 775 
No. of cities 19 19 19 
No. of observations 48,050 48,050 48,050 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the two-digit industry and municipality level; 
2) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent; 3) All the explanatory variables measured in 
its logarithmic form (those with zero values have been transformed as detailed in the text); 4) laboric, inputic, 
outputic and technoic are (weighted) sums of the employment in different industries in each municipality. The 
weights are industry-specific and reflect the intensity of inter-industry relationships. laboric is the 
employment in industries that use workers with the same occupations as those employed in industry i. 
inputic is the employment in  industry i’s input suppliers. outputic is the employment in industry i’s customers 
and technoic is the employment in industries that use the same new production technologies as those used in 
industry i; 5) n.i. indicates that the variable is not identified because it does not vary across industries in a 
given municipality.  
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 Table 4. The effect on the creation of new firms of increasing employment (by one 
thousand employees) in industries that share workers, have a customer-supplier 
relationship and share knowledge  
Agglomeration mechanisms Between-cities evidence Within-cities evidence 
Labor Market Pooling;    
laboric 2.238*** 1.561*** 
Input Sharing;   
inputic 1.421*** 1.449*** 
outputic 0.059 0.139* 
Knowledge Spillovers;   
technoic 0.103 0.603*** 
Notes: 1) Effects implied by the estimates reported in the third columns of Table 2 and 3 
(Between-cities and within-cities evidence); 2) The marginal effect is computed for each 
observation and averaged across all observations; 3)***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 
10%. 
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Table 5. Robustness checks. Alternative weight schemes. Poisson estimates (between-cities 
evidence). The dependent variable is the count of new firms created by industry and city. 
 
Closest 10 (labor) and 
3 (techno) industries, 
weighted 
Closest 15 (labor) and 
5 (techno) industries, 
weighted 
Closest 10 (labor) and 
3 (techno) industries, 
unweighted 
Agglomeration mechanisms    
0.118*** 0.111*** 0.119*** Labor Market Pooling;  
laboric  (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) 
Input Sharing;    
0.264*** 0.248*** 0.264*** inputic (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
0.042 0.0676 0.042 outputic (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
0.010 0.0208 0.010 Knowledge Spillovers; 
technoic (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) 
Controls    
City employment 
(excluding that of industry i) n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Own industry city employment Yes Yes Yes 
City land area n.i. n.i. n.i. 
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects 
(17 NUTS 2 regions) n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of industries 75 75 75 
No. of cities 477 477 477 
No. of observations 35,775 35,775 35,775 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the two-digit industry and city level; 2) ***, ** 
and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%; 3) All the explanatory variables measured in its logarithmic 
form (those with zero values have been transformed as detailed in the text); 4) laboric, inputic, outputic and technoic 
are (weighted) sums of the employment in different industries in each city. The weights are industry-specific 
and reflect the intensity of inter-industry relationships. laboric is the employment in industries that use 
workers with the same occupations as those employed in industry i. inputic is the employment in industry i’s 
input suppliers. outputic is the employment in industry i’s customers and technoic is the employment in 
industries that use the same new production technologies as those used in industry i; 5) n.i. indicates that the 
variable is not identified because it does not vary across industries in a given city.  
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Table 6. Robustness checks. Alternative weight schemes. Poisson estimates (within-cities 
evidence). The dependent variable is the count of new firms created by industry and 
municipality. 
 
Closest 10 (labor) and 
3 (techno) industries, 
weighted 
Closest 15 (labor) and 
5 (techno) industries, 
weighted 
Closest 10 (labor) and 
3 (techno) industries, 
unweighted 
Agglomeration mechanisms    
0.099*** 0.091** 0.105*** Labor Market Pooling;  
laboric  (0.033) (0.041) (0.034) 
Input Sharing;    
0.369*** 0.372*** 0.370*** inputic (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) 
0.095* 0.128** 0.093* outputic (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
0.130*** 0.099*** 0.115*** Knowledge Spillovers; 
technoic (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) 
Controls    
Overall municipality employment  
(excluding that of industry i) n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Own industry employment in the 
municipality  Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality land area n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effects n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of industries 62 62 62 
No. of municipalities 755 755 755 
No. of cities 19 19 19 
No. of observations 48,050 48,050 48,050 
Notes: 1) Poisson estimates based on the third specification of Table 3 (replicated in the first column); 2) 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the two-digit industry and municipality level; 3) ***, ** 
and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%; 4) All the explanatory variables measured in its logarithmic form 
(those with zero values have been transformed as detailed in the text); 5) laboric, inputic, outputic and technoic are 
(weighted) sums of the employment in different industries in each municipality. The weights are industry-
specific and reflect the intensity of inter-industry relationships. laboric is the employment in industries that use 
workers with the same occupations as those employed in industry i. inputic is the employment in industry i’s 
input suppliers. outputic is the employment in industry i’s customers and technoic is the employment in industries 
that use the same new production technologies as those used in industry i; 6) n.i. indicates that the variable is 
not identified because it does not vary across industries in a given municipality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29
 Table 7. Robustness checks. Alternative definitions of large city defined by the 
population of the largest municipality in the city. Poisson estimates. The dependent 
variable is the count of new firms created by industry and municipality.  
 >500,000 inhabitants 
>200,000 
Inhabitants 
>150,000 
Inhabitants 
Agglomeration mechanisms    
0.126*** 0.099*** 0.088*** Labor Market Pooling;  
laboric  (0.043) (0.033) (0.028) 
Input Sharing;    
0.360*** 0.369*** 0.377*** inputic (0.077) (0.060) (0.053) 
0.066 0.095* 0.103** outputic (0.072) (0.055) (0.050) 
0.237*** 0.130*** 0.105*** Knowledge Spillovers; 
technoic (0.0539) (0.034) (0.029) 
Controls    
Overall municipality employment  
(excluding that in industry i) n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Own industry employment in the municipality  Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality land area n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effects n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of industries 62 62 62 
No. of municipalities 348 755 1,421 
No. of cities 6 19 30 
No. of observations 21,576 48,050 88,102 
Notes: 1) Poisson estimates based on the third specification of Table 3 (replicated in the first column); 2) 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the two-digit industry and municipality level; 3) ***, ** 
and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%; 4) All the explanatory variables measured in its logarithmic 
form (those with zero values have been transformed as detailed in the text); 5) laboric, inputic, outputic and 
technoic are (weighted) sums of the employment in different industries in each municipality. The weights are 
industry-specific and reflect the intensity of inter-industry relationships. laboric is the employment in 
industries that use workers with the same occupations as those employed in industry i. inputic is the 
employment in industry i’s input suppliers. outputic is the employment in industry i’s customers and technoic is 
the employment in industries that use the same new production technologies as those used in industry i; 6) 
n.i. indicates that the variable is not identified because it does not vary across industries in a given 
municipality.  
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 Annex. Table A1. 1994 National Classification of Occupations (CNO 94)   
Code Title Code Title 
001 Armed forces: top officers  232 Judges  
002 Armed forces: middle officers  239 Legal professionals not elsewhere classified  
003 Armed forces: regular officers  241 Business professionals  
101 Legislators  242 Economists  
102 Senior government officials  243 Social science and related professionals  
103 Heads of villages & towns  251 Writers and creative or performing artists  
104 Senior officials of special-interest organisations  252 Archivists, librarians and related information professionals  
111 Directors and chief executives  253 Other professionals in the Public Administration  
112 Production and operations department managers  261 Physical and engineering science technicians  
113 Other department managers  262 Mathematics and statistics technicians  
121 General managers in wholesale trade with less than 10 employees  263 Computer associate professionals  
122 General managers in retail trade with less than 10 employees  264 Architecture technicians  
131 General managers of hotels with less than 10 employees  265 Engineering technicians (e.g., ship and aircraft technicians)  
132 General managers of restaurants with less than 10 employees  271 Life science technicians and related associate professionals  
140 General managers not elsewhere classified with less than 10 employees  272 Nursing and midwifery associate professionals  
151 General managers in wholesale trade with no employees  281 Primary and pre-primary education teaching associate professionals  
152 General managers in retail trade with no employees  282 Special education teaching associate professionals  
161 General managers of hotels with no employees  283 Other teaching associate professionals  
162 General managers of restaurants with no employees  291 Accountants, personnel and careers professionals, and other  
170 General managers not elsewhere classified with no employees  292 Archivists, librarians and related information professionals  
201 Physicists, chemists and related professionals  293 Social science and related professionals  
202 Mathematicians, statisticians and related professionals  294 Religious professionals  
203 Computing professionals  295 Government professionals  
204 Architects, town and traffic planners  301 Draughtspersons  
205 Engineers  302 Physical, chemical and engineering science technicians  
211 Life science professionals  303 Computer assistants  
212 Medical doctors & dentists  304 Optical and electronic equipment operators  
213 Veterinarians  305 Ships' engineers, deck officers and pilots  
214 Pharmacists  306 Aircraft pilots, air traffic controllers and safety technicians  
219 Health professionals (except nursing) not elsewhere classified  307 Safety, health and quality inspectors  
221 College, university and higher education teaching professionals  311 Life science technicians  
222 Secondary education teaching professionals  312 Medical assistants  
223 Other teaching professionals  313 Modern health associate professionals (except nursing) not elsewhere classified  
231 Lawyers  321 Pre-primary and special education teaching associate professionals  
232 Judges  322 Other teaching associate professionals  
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 Annex. Table A1. 1994 National Classification of Occupations (CNO 94) (Continuation) 
Code Title Code Title 
331 Finance and sales associate professionals  532 Shop salespersons and demonstrators  
332 Technical and commercial sales representatives  533 Stall and market salespersons  
341 Administrative associate professionals  601 Self-employed market gardeners and crop growers  
342 Customs, tax and related government associate professionals  602 Employed market gardeners and crop growers  
351 Business services agents and trade brokers  611 Self-employed market-oriented animal producers and related workers  
352 Police inspectors and detectives  612 Employed market-oriented animal producers and related workers  
353 Social work associate professionals  621 Self-employed market-oriented crop and animal producers  
354 Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals  622 Self-employed forestry and related workers  
355 Religious clerks 623 Employed market-oriented crop and animal producers  
401 Numerical clerks  624 Employed forestry and related workers  
402 Material-recording and transport clerks  631 Self-employed fishery workers, hunters and trappers  
410 Library, mail and related clerks  632 Employed fishery workers, hunters and trappers  
421 Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks  701 Foremen of building frame and related trades workers  
422 Data entry operators  702 Foremen of building finishers and related  workers  
430 Other office clerks with no contact with customers  703 Painters, building structure cleaners and related trades  
440 Other office clerks with contact with customers  711 Bricklayers and stonemasons  
451 Client information clerks  712 Concrete placers, concrete finishers and related workers  
452 Travel agency, receptionists and information clerks, and related  713 Carpenters and joiners  
460 Cashiers, tellers and related clerks  714 Building frame and related trades workers not elsewhere classified  
501 Cooks  721 Plasterers  
502 Waiters, waitresses and bartenders  722 Plumbers and pipe fitters  
503 Restaurant and bar maitresses  723 Building and related electricians  
511 Institution and home-based personal care workers  724 Painters, varnishers and related painters and workers  
512 Other personal care and related workers  725 Building structure cleaners  
513 Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians and related workers  729 Building finishers and related trades workers not elsewhere classified  
514 Travel attendants and related workers  731 Shopfloor foremen of metal moulders, welders, sheet-metal workers  
515 Housekeepers and related workers  732 Shopfloor foremen of motor vehicle mechanics and fitters  
519 Other personal services workers  733 Shopfloor foremen of machinery and aircraft engine mechanics  
521 Paramilitary police officers  734 Shopfloor foremen of electrical and electronic equipment  
522 Police officers  741 Foremen of miners, shotfirers, stone cutters and carvers  
523 Fire-fighters  742 Miners, shotfirers, stone cutters and carvers  
524 Prison guards  751 Metal moulders, welders, sheet-metal workers, structural metal workers  
525 Private guards  752 Blacksmiths, tool-makers and related trades workers  
529 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified  761 Machinery mechanics and fitters  
531 Fashion and other models  762 Electrical and electronic equipment mechanics and fitter  
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 Annex. Table A1. 1994 National Classification of Occupations (CNO 94) (Continuation) 
Code Title Code Title 
771 Precision workers in metal and related materials  834 Wood-products machine operators  
772 Printing and related trades workers  835 Printing-, binding- and paper-products machine operators  
773 Potters, glass-makers and related trades workers  836 Textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators  
774 Handicraft workers in wood, textile, leather and related workers  837 Food and related products machine operators  
780 Food processing and related trades workers  841 Assemblers  
791 Wood treaters and related trades workers  849 Other machine operators and assemblers  
792 Joiners and cabinet-makers  851 Locomotive-engine drivers and related workers  
793 Textile, garment and related trades workers  852 Foremen of agricultural and other mobile-plant operators  
794 Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers  853 Agricultural and other mobile-plant operators  
801 Foremen of mining- and mineral-processing-plant operator  854 Other agricultural and other mobile-plant operators not elsewhere classified  
802 Foremen of metal-processing-plant operators  855 Ships' deck crews and related workers  
803 Foremen of glass, ceramics and related plant operators  861 Car, taxi and van drivers  
804 Foremen of wood-processing- and papermaking-plant operators  862 Bus and tram drivers  
805 Shopfloor foremen of chemical-processing-plant operators  863 Heavy truck and lorry drivers  
806 Shopfloor foremen of power-production and related plant operators  864 Motor-cycle drivers  
807 Shopfloor foremen of automated-assembly-line and industr  900 Street vendors and related workers  
811 Mining- and mineral-processing-plant operators  911 Domestic helpers and cleaners  
812 Metal-processing-plant operators  912 Helpers and cleaners in offices, hotels and other establishments  
813 Glass, ceramics and related plant operators  921 Building caretakers, window and related cleaners  
814 Wood-processing- and papermaking-plant operators  922 Watchpersons  
815 Chemical-processing-plant operators  931 Shoe cleaning and other street services elementary occupations  
816 Power-production and related plant operators  932 Doorkeepers and related workers  
817 Automated-assembly-line and industrial-robot operators  933 Messengers, package and luggage porters and deliverers  
821 Foremen of metal- and mineral-products machine operators  934 Vending-machine money collectors, meter readers and related workers  
822 Foremen of chemical-products machine operators  935 Garbage collectors and related labourers  
823 Foremen of rubber- and plastic-products machine operators  941 Agricultural labourers  
824 Foremen of wood-products machine operators  942 Catlle, hunting and trapping labourers  
825 Shopfllor foremen of printing-, binding- and paper-production  943 Farm-hands and labourers  
826 Foremen of textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators  944 Forestry labourers  
827 Foremen of food and related products machine operators  945 Fishery labourers  
828 Foremen of assemblers  950 Mining and quarrying labourers  
831 Metal- and mineral-products machine operators  960 Building and other construction and maintenance labourer  
832 Chemical-products machine operators  970 Manufacturing labourers  
833 Rubber- and plastic-products machine operators  980 Transport labourers and freight handlers 
Source: National Statistics Institute (INE) 
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Annex. Table A2. New technologies in manufacturing classification (1998 Technological 
Innovation in Companies Survey) 
1.1 Computer Assisted Design (CAD) and/or computer assisted engineering (CAE) 
1.2 Computer assisted design applicable to the monitoring of the production of machinery (computer assisted manufacturing) CAD/CAM 
1.3 Use of the digital output of the CAD for buying or provisioning activities 
2.1 NC/CNC autonomous machines 
2.2 Flexible manufacturing cells or systems (FMC/FMS) 
2.3 Laser for the treatment of material 
2.4 Advanced technologies other than those using laser 
2.5 Pick & Place robots 
2.6 Other more complex robots 
3.1 Automatic storage and recovery systems 
3.2 Automatic guided vehicle systems 
4.1 Inspection based on automated sensor and/or test equipment conducted in the input of materials or during the process 
4.2 Inspection based on automated sensor and/or test equipment conducted on the final product 
5.1 Local area network computers for technical information 
5.2 Local area network computers for use in factory 
5.3 Information network between companies connecting the factory with subcontractors, suppliers and/or clients 
5.4 Internet/electronic mail 
5.5 Programmable logic controllers 
5.6 Industrial control computers 
6.1 Total quality control 
6.2 Just in time systems 
6.3 Planning of material needs 
6.4 Planning of manufacturing resources 
7.1 Manufacturing integrated by computer 
7.2 Entry and supervision of production data 
7.3 Artificial intelligence and/or expert systems 
Source: National Statistics Institute (INE) 
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